I'm reading Francis Fukuyama's latest book, The Origins of Political Order, an ambitious survey of the development of political institutions and centers of power across civilizations. Sitting as we are, at a juncture between ascendent East and declining West, it's a good time to look back and extract some basic principles governing the rise and fall of civilizations.
Fukuyama starts off with instinctive human nature, the social and political baggage our species carries from our not-too-distant primate past. Primitive humans and other apes live in communities with definite social structure. But, up until recently, it was thought that primitive man was solitary. This view was held by enlightenment philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, originators of the theory of the social contract, and the idea of natural human rights, respectively. It's a bit discomfiting to consider that inaccurate ideas about the isolation of man in a state of nature strongly influence the American founding father's views on individualism.
In the time period covered by the book, up to the French Revolution, societies are mainly agrarian and structured into classes - a ruling nobility, land owning aristocracy, and peasantry. From this largely hereditary state, the middle class begins to emerge and modern states coalesce.
Fukuyama's three crucial characteristics of the modern state are a strong state, rule of law, and accountability. States successfully implementing all three of these institutions are generally free, prosperous, and stable. Fukuyama calls the process of reaching this happy balance getting to denmark.
Given these institutions and social classes, Fukuyama seeks to derive a theory of political development and decay - not a fully predictive theory, but a contingent theory, like evolution, dependent on historical accidents and circumstances.
Capable, accountable, rule-bound governments emerge when a delicate balance is struck between the classes / power centers. Absent this balance, various pathologies result in the form of dominance of one class or a coalition of classes against the others. Political systems rise, but they also decay. The rats always find a way in. "Over time, elites are able to protect their positions by gaming the political system [...] transmitting these advantages to their children through favored access to elite institutions"
The book builds its argument by surveying the history of political development in several countries. As a conscious effort to avoid Eurocentrism, China's early development of meritocratic bureaucracy is examined first. India, the Middle East, Europe and Russia follow. In each region, driven by agriculture, religion and warfare, political systems rise and fall striking different balances of power, always attended by the persistent reassertion of rent-seeking elites.
The Chinese state, which achieved a powerful state and meritocratic bureaucracy in Qin and Han dynasties around 200 BC, never succeeds in subordinating the state to rule of law. India develops rule of law and accountability, but with a weak central state. The Middle East gains and looses rule of law and accountability. In Russia, the rulers dominate unchecked by either law or any notion of accountability. The French monarchy was beholden to its aristocracy by debt, resulting in a weak central state and widespread corruption.
England is first to achieve all three ingredients. With the Magna Carta in 1215, the aristocracy obligated the monarchy to recognize their rights. Over time these rights came to apply increasingly widely across society, particularly to the rising middle class.
NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the land.
I might have been put off if I had known that the author was, at one time, associated with the neoconservative movement and had previously declared the "end of history". That would have been a shame. The Origins of Political Order is a fascinating read. The book is carefully constructed to avoid pushing ideological buttons, and makes its case largely independent of partisan politics. England and Denmark are held up as successful examples. The historical development proceeds from Chinese history first. I don't know my history well enough to evaluate the individual examples, but the framework for thinking about political development and centers of power seems to have a lot of value.
The planned second volume picks the story up in the modern age after the industrial revolution. Applying the same framework to the modern world is complicated by the post-colonial legacy, greatly increased communication, and globalization, along with entirely new actors such as corporations. It should be even more interesting than the first volume.
Reviews and commentary
On it's release, in April of 2011, the book generated lot of commentary, including write-ups in a slew of major newspapers, plus a bunch of blogs linked below. The author appears on several interview shows and podcasts. I'm going to hold off on all of this until after I finish the book, to give myself time to think about it.
- NY Times Francis Fukuyama’s Theory of the State
- Also from the NY Times: From ‘End of History’ Author, a Look at the Beginning and Middle
- Washington Post
- The Economist Theories of history: The good, the great and the gelded
- the Guardian
- Financial Times
- WSJ From Dynasty to Democracy Nations did not find stability, or sustained prosperity, until they became accountable to their citizens
- Slate
Interviews, audio and video
- Carnegie Council
- BookTV: Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order
- The Free Library Podcast
- New Books in History
- KQED forum
- NPR
- Francis Fukuyama & Jared Diamond
No comments:
Post a Comment